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THESIS ABSTRACT
Chelsea D. Clinton
Master of Science
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Title: Choosing Health Insurance: Public, Private or None?
I estimate two models of consumer health insurance choices where individual
attributes and e.g., income, age, gender, cost, etc. a↵ect qualification for specific
programs e.g., Medicaid and Medicare, but also a↵ect the choices individuals make.
From these results, I assess how these attributes a↵ect health insurance choices
using the 2008 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. I then use these results to
predict how individual health insurance choices change with the implementation of
the Patient Protection and A↵ordable Care Act (ACA) in 2014. My predictions
estimate that more 50 percent of those who become eligible for Medicaid under ACA
will switch to Medicaid or choose to have both Private and Medicaid insurance.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
U.S. health care expenditures increased dramatically during the past two
decades, growing from $714 billion in 1990 to $2.5 trillion in 2009. Growth of health
care expenditures exceeded the U.S. inflation rate in both 2008 and 2009, growing
at a rate of 4.7 percent and 4.0 percent respectively (CMS, 2009; BLS, 2001). The
cost of providing health insurance also continues to rise. Premiums for
employer-sponsored health insurance plans increased 131 percent between 1999 and
2009 (KFF, 2010b). Due in part to the soaring costs of health insurance,
approximately 49.5 million Americans, about one in six, were without any health
insurance in 2010 (CDC, 2011).
Most Americans that do have health insurance are limited to just a few options.
Private insurance is theoretically an option to everyone, but is too expensive for
many individuals and families to purchase on their own. Most often consumers
secure private health insurance through employers that o↵er it as a fringe benefit.
Low-income consumers and those with certain medical conditions are eligible for
Medicaid, a form of public insurance o↵ered by each state. Medicare, a federal
public insurance program, is available to almost all American citizens and legal
residents age 65 and over as well as those with some particular medical conditions.
Previous research has focused on the impacts of these choices. Some estimate
the impact of consumer health insurance choice by evaluating how it a↵ects utility
and e ciency (Abaluck, 2009; Dafny, 2010). Others have estimated consumer
demand for certain health insurance options (Brau, 2008; Kerssens, 2005). In this
study, I fill a gap in the literature by estimating what characteristics make
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individuals more likely to make certain health insurance options.
In this study, I estimate two models of consumer health insurance choices where
individual attributes e.g., income, age, gender, cost, etc. a↵ect qualification for
specific programs e.g., Medicaid and Medicare, but also a↵ect the choices
individuals make. From these results, I assess how these attributes a↵ect health
insurance choices using the 2008 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. Using these
results, I estimate how consumers will choose health insurance when the Patient
Protection and A↵ordable Care Act is implemented in 2014, expanding Medicaid to
all individuals at or below 133 percent of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL). I
estimate that more than 60 percent of newly eligible consumers will enroll in
Medicaid in 2014.
In order to understand current consumer choices it is important to understand
the history, background and trends for each choice available. I present this
information in the following section.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND
About 85.6 percent of Americans had some form of health insurance in 2007
through private insurance companies, Medicaid, Medicare or a mix of these
programs. About 66.7 percent had health insurance through private companies, 14.3
percent through Medicare and 14.1 percent through Medicaid 2007 (with some
individuals belonging to more than one category) (Gruber, 2009). The options
available vary across individuals based on age, health status, income, and the cost of
each option varies for each individual as well.1 Each of the options included in the
sample has a unique history, specific qualifying rules and o↵ers various levels of
coverage.
Medicaid
President Linden B. Johnson signed Medicaid and Medicare into law on July 30,
1965. While Medicaid has undergone many modifications, the purpose of the
program remains to provide health care to low-income Americans. Currently about
52 million Americans receive services paid for by Medicaid. The rules to qualify for
Medicaid coverage vary by state.
Those served by Medicaid fall into three general categories: the categorically
needy, the medically needy and special groups. The Federal government requires
states to serve the categorically needy. The categorically needy include those who
1This study only includes individuals who chose Medicaid, Medicare, private insurance or no
insurance. While other public insurance programs such as TriCare exist, those participating were
dropped from the sample for identification purposes.
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meet states Aid to Families with Dependent Children requirements, pregnant
women and children under the age of six whose family income is at or below 133
percent of the Federal poverty level (FPL), children ages 6 to 19 with family income
up to 100 percent of the FPL, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipients and
individuals and couples living in medical institutions with monthly income up to
300 percent of the SSI income standard. In 2005, 34 states and the District of
Columbia provided Medicaid programs for the medically needy. The medically
needy include pregnant women through a 60-day postpartum period, children under
age 18, certain newborns for one year and certain protected blind persons, plus
many other optional programs that states may choose to participate in. Special
programs provided by Medicaid include providing premiums for people age 65 and
over with incomes up to 100 percent of the FPL, Medicare premiums for qualified
disabled workers, temporary coverage for women who have breast or cervical cancer
and temporary coverage for people with tuberculosis who are uninsured. Coverage
of these special programs also varies by state (CMS, 2005).
Medicare
Prior to the implementation of Medicare in 1965 about one-half of all seniors in
the U.S. lacked health insurance. Medicare provides nearly universal coverage to
Americans age 65 and over and also provided care to younger people with
permanent disabilities. In 2010, this program served about 47 million people and
constituted about 12 percent of the federal budget.
Medicare has undergone extensive revisions since its implementation. Today, it
consists of 4 parts: A, B, C and D. Medicare Part A is commonly known as hospital
insurance (HI). It covers inpatient hospital services, skilled nursing facility, home
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health and hospice care. Expenditures on Part A account for about 36 percent of
total Medicare expenditures. Medicare Part B helps to cover physician, outpatient,
home health and preventive services. Expenditures on Part B account for about 24
percent of total Medicare expenditures. Medicare Part C is also called the Medicare
Advantage Program. It allows Medicare beneficiaries to enroll in a private insurance
plan. Medicare pays these private plans to provide benefits covered by Medicare
including those services covered by Parts A and B. Medicare Part C accounted for
about 24 percent of total Medicare expenditures in 2009. In 2003, the Medicare
Modernization Act created Medicare Part D, or the outpatient prescription drug
benefits plan and was implemented in 2006. Medicare beneficiaries who sign up for
Part D sign up with a private insurer and generally pay a monthly premium.
Medicare contracts with these private insurers to provide prescription drug benefits.
Part D accounted for about 10 percent of total Medicare expenditures in 2009
(KFF, 2010a).
Private Insurance
The most common source of health insurance in the U.S. is private insurance. Of
those with health insurance, 78.8 percent had private health insurance in 2008. Of
those with private insurance, the majority receive insurance through employer-based
programs. Typically, employees and employers split the cost of the health insurance
premium, with individual employees picking up about 16 percent of the bill and
employees with families paying about 27 percent of the bill. Only about 13.3
percent of individuals with private insurance purchase it directly from the insurance
company (Gruber, 2009).
Private insurance operates through employment for two primary reasons: risk
5
pooling and an employee tax subsidy. Private insurers who insure a large group of
people in a risk pool, such as a business, will have a client base with a predictable
distribution of medical risk. Pooling risk via large groups of people allows health
insurance companies to collect enough money in premiums to cover the medical
costs of the pool. The second benefit of providing insurance through employers is
the tax subsidy. When employees opt into employer sponsored health plans, they do
not have to pay taxes on the income used by the employer to purchase their health
insurance. If the employer paid the employee the same amount of money used to
purchase the employee’s health insurance, then the employee would be taxed on that
income, even if it was used to buy health insurance. Thus, the employee receives a
tax break by purchasing health insurance through an employer (Gruber, 2009).
No Insurance
Theoretically, all Americans have access to private health insurance, many low
income families have access to Medicaid, and most people age 65 and over have
access to Medicare. Yet, in practice, a significant group of Americans do not have
health insurance. Thus, one final category must be added to the list: no insurance.
Americans fall into this group for many reasons. Some choose not to purchase
health insurance because the costs exceed the benefits. Others simply cannot a↵ord
coverage. In particular, those with pre-existing conditions often must pay exorbitant
premiums to get any health insurance at all.
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In 2008, the uninsured received about $56 billion worth of uncompensated care
and paid about $30 billion out-of-pocket. The U.S. government paid for about 75
percent of the uncompensated care through various programs including Medicaid
DSH and supplemental payment programs, Medicare DSH and IME payments
(Hadley, 2008).
Patient Protection and A↵ordable Care Act
The U. S. government enacted Patient Protection and A↵ordable Care Act
(ACA) in order to eliminate this group labeled no insurance. By implementing new
regulations on the health insurance industry, the U.S. government is attempting to
insurance all Americans by 2014. E↵orts to make health care a↵ordable to all
Americans involve making many changes to the current system. ACA extends
private coverage by requiring most employers to o↵er health insurance plans.
Employers with more than 50 employees that do not o↵er health insurance coverage
and employers with more than 200 employees that do not automatically enroll
employees in a health insurance plan will be taxed. Furthermore, all plans, both
individual and group, must include dependent coverage for children up to age 26.
ACA expands Medicaid coverage to include, at a minimum, all U.S. citizens and
lawful immigrants with incomes up to 133 percent of the poverty line. In addition,
it imposes a penalty of $695 an individual, $2,085 per family or 2.5 percent of
income, whichever is greater, for those who do not have health insurance for more
than a 3-month period (KFF, 2011). In essence, the U.S. government is providing
every citizen and legal resident with an incentive to purchase health insurance and
providing employers with an incentive to help their employees comply.
One of the most significant changes from ACA is the implementation of health
7
insurance exchanges. A health insurance exchange is an organized marketplace in
which consumers can buy health insurance. The exchanges are meant to help foster
competition, spread risk, protect consumers and help consumers make informed
decisions about their health insurance (Urban Institute).
Given the dynamic nature of the current state of health care reform, it is
important to consider the implications that the policy will have on consumers of
health insurance. In this study, I estimate how changes in health insurance
eligibility rules will e↵ect the size and member characteristics of Medicaid, the
option most a↵ected by ACA.
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CHAPTER III
LITERATURE REVIEW
There are many papers that examine e↵ects of health insurance on outcomes.
This section reviews those papers which focus on the e↵ects of giving consumers
choices in their health insurance and the e↵ects of public health insurance expansion.
One line of literature examines the utility and e↵ectiveness of giving consumers
choice in terms of their specific health insurance plan. Consumers face a menu of
options when choosing a health insurance plan which o↵er varying degrees of utility.
Abaluck and Gruber (2009) compare health insurance choices among the elderly
choosing their own plans within Medicare Part D. They find that most seniors who
utilized the Medicare Part D option failed to choose the most e cient portfolio
available, meaning that many seniors could have chosen plans that o↵ered better
risk protection at a lower price (Abaluck, 2009). Dafny, Ho, and Varela (2010) also
examine the question of insurance plan choice. They find that gains in terms of
welfare from giving employees choice instead of the employee getting the employer
sponsored plan are equal to about 20 percent of premiums. Ultimately they find
that employees would be willing to give up 27 percent of their employer subsidy in
order to have the ability to choose their own plan (Dafney, 2010).
Various studies look at the crowd-out e↵ect of public insurance on private
insurance. Koch (2010a) finds that the crowd-out e↵ect is greatest in a population
of eligible children when a family’s income is least. Koch (2010b) investigates the
e↵ects of public health insurance on adult members of the households with children
enrolled in public health insurance plans. He finds that public health insurance
crowds out the private health insurance of adults by up to 17 percent. Currie and
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Gruber (2001) also examine the e↵ect of expanding public health care by estimating
the e↵ect of Medicaid expansion on medical treatment received by women at
childbirth. While treatment intensity increases for women who previously had no
insurance, it decreases for women who previously had private insurance. These
findings draw attention to the potential trade-o↵s of an expansion of public health
insurance.
Other studies expand on the literature by examining the e↵ect of health
insurance choices on health care utilization for certain age groups that tend to face
changing health insurance choice sets. Anderson, Dobkin and Gross (2010) examine
the e↵ect of young adults losing their health care coverage on health care utilization.
The authors find that the uninsured in this population reduce their use of
emergency departments and hospital visits. Card, Dobkin and Maestas (2008)
compare health-related outcomes of patients just under and over 65 years old. They
pay special attention to the e↵ects of Medicare across di↵erent socioeconomic
subgroups. They find discrete increases in use of medical services once consumers
have Medicare insurance coverage.
Koch 2009 uses the MEPS data to explore whether or not non-group insurance
market fills the insurance market gap for those who do not have access to
employer-provided insurance. He finds that while non-group insurance does help fill
the gap, it leaves many holes. These holes vary by age, gender, income and health
status, but are present in all cases. Given the economic theory that consumers will
demand insurance if the market is competitive, if they have full information and if
the price is actuarially fair, this hole is puzzling.
This study expands on the literature by estimating what characteristics make
individuals more likely to make certain health insurance choices. Using this
information, I predict how choices change given changes mandated by ACA.
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CHAPTER IV
THE MODEL
This study uses a logit model to examine the choice of options as developed in
this section. The logit model includes seven mutually exclusive and exhaustive
alternatives. The seven alternatives are Private Insurance, Medicaid, Medicare,
Private Insurance and Medicaid, Private Insurance and Medicare, Medicaid and
Medicare and no insurance. Each alternative provides the individual consumer with
a di↵erent amount of utility.
The conceptual framework of the logit model relies on a random utility function
with certain characteristics. Let i be an individual consumer characteristics. For
each consumer, let the set of the individual’s health care alternatives be denoted by
Ji. Then the consumer’s utility function is:
Uij = Vij + "in
where Vij is the observed or known component of the utility function and "ij is the
unobserved or unknown part of the utility function.
Consumers use their utility functions to establish preferences among health
insurance alternatives. Table 1 gives an example of a consumer’s utility function in
the proposed research. By ranking each utility function from highest to lowest, the
consumer can determine which health insurance option is optimal given individual
preferences. For example, a consumer may rank their utility functions as follows:
UA > UB > UC > UD > UE > UF > UG. In this example, the consumer’s random
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utility functions look like this:
Prob(yi = j) = Prob(Uj   Uk) for all k
= Prob(Uik   Uij  0), for all k
= Prob("ik   "ij  Vij   Vik), for all k.
A logit model predicts the consumer’s choice over J alternatives using the
following formula:
pij =
exp(x0ij  + z
0
i j)Pm
j=1 exp(x
0
il  + z
0
i l)
, j = 1, ...,m,
where Ji + 1 is the number of choices available to i, xi are the characteristics of
consumer i.
One alternative must be omitted from the calculation. This alternative is
considered a “baseline case. All other cases are computed relative to this baseline
case.
The coe cients of the choice model are not usually directly interpreted. This is
because the signs on the coe cient do not indicate that an increase in the regressor
leads to an increase in the probability of that choice. Calculating the marginal
e↵ects (ME) of each regressor reveals this information. For an individual i, the kth
regressor and alternative j, the ME of a change in the kth regressor on the
probability that j is the alternative chosen is:
MEijk =
 Prob(yi = j)
 xik
.
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In this paper, the average marginal e↵ects are presented. That is, the marginal
e↵ects are computed for each individual, then averaged. All regressors are held at
means except for the kth regressor.
13
CHAPTER V
DATA
The data used to estimate this model is from the Household Component of the
2008 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) collected by the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality. This is available online at
http://meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data stats/download data files detail.jsp?
cboPufNumber=HC-121 (Last accessed January 2012).
MEPS is comprised of a set of large-scale surveys including surveys of families
and individuals, their medical providers (healthcare providers, hospitals,
pharmacies, etc.) and their employers. The MEPS sample includes families and
individuals from selected communities across the U.S. The particular data used is a
subsample of households that participated in a survey in the previous year called
the National Health Interview Survey conducted by the National Center for Health
Statistics. Through household interviews MEPS collects information about
demographic characteristics, health status, health conditions, use of medical
services, payment methods for medical care, satisfaction with care, health insurance
coverage, income and employment. The survey takes place in rounds over a
two-year period which makes it possible to examine the relationships between
healthcare, health insurance, income, employment and other variables.
The dependent variable is a consumer’s health insurance choice. Each
individuals choice falls into one of seven categories: Private, Medicaid, Medicare,
Private & Medicaid, Private & Medicare, Medicaid & Medicare or No Health
Insurance. Membership in a category means that the participant had the specified
type of health insurance for at least one month during 2008. Each category is
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mutually exclusive.
Not all individuals have access to all types of health insurance. Medicaid is only
available to the poor, as defined by each state. Medicare provides insurance to those
age 65 and over and to the disabled who meet certain criteria. Private insurance is
available to all people for a price with some exceptions typically due to pre-existing
conditions. I limit the choice set based on the information available about the
observations in the dataset.
For the purposes of this study, private health insurance refers to non-public
health insurance, which, at a minimum, provides benefits for hospital and physician
services (including Medigap coverage). All individuals have this option.
Medicaid refers to the public health program described in Section 2.1.
Individuals who report receiving Medicaid coverage as well as those who paid
nothing for their public hospital/physician insurance when such coverage was
through a Medicaid HMO are considered to have Medicaid in the MEPS data. The
data do no not include state-level identifiers. Due to this limitation, Medicaid
eligibility is estimated by using the mean thresholds from all 50 states. In addition,
consumers who chose Medicaid, regardless of their perceived eligibility status, were
included in this category. In addition, individuals who received welfare, Temporary
Assistance for needy Families, Social Security Incomes are also considered eligible
for Medicaid due to Federal guidelines. Table 1 summarizes the values used.
Table 1. Medicaid Eligibility Threshold Levels
Eligibility Group Eligibility Threshold (% FPL)
Pregnant Women 188
Parents 89
Childless Adults 18
Disabled, Aged, Blind 85
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Medicare refers to the public health program described in Section 2.2. For the
purposes of this study, all those age 65 or over are considered eligible for Medicare.
All individuals are considered eligible for No Health Insurance category.
Demographics of the Sample
Table 2 shows the total amount of consumers eligible for each type of health
insurance and the total amount who chose each option. Of the 20,958 consumers
included in the sample, more than half chose Private Insurance. All public and
combination public/private programs comprise less than 10 percent of the
population. Of those, Medicaid comprises the largest portion with 9.23 percent of
the sample. About 22 percent of the sample has No Insurance.
Table 2. Sample Characteristics
Choice Eligible for Option Percent 1 Percent 2
1 Private Insurance 11,114 20,958 53.03% 53.03%
2 Medicaid 1,934 3,925 49.27% 9.23%
3 Medicare 1,282 3,101 41.34% 6.12%
4 Private & Medicaid 250 3,925 6.37% 1.19%
5 Private & Medicare 1,313 3,101 42.34% 6.26%
6 Medicaid & Medicare 459 757 60.63% 2.19%
7 No Health Insurance 4,606 20,958 21.98% 21.98%
Totals 20,958 56,725
Percent 1: Percent of eligible for option choosing option.
Percent 2: Percent of total sample choosing option.
Each individual faces one of four choice sets based on the eligibility rules of the
program. Everyone is eligible for Private Insurance and No Insurance. Others are
eligible for Medicaid too. Those 65 and older are eligible for Medicare in addition to
Private Insurance and No Insurance. Finally, some consumers are eligible for all
types of insurance modeled here.
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1. Private Insurance, No Insurance
2. Private Insurance, Medicaid, Private & Medicaid, No Insurance
3. Private Insurance, Medicare, Private & Medicare, No Insurance
4. Private Insurance, Medicaid, Medicare, Private & Medicaid, Private &
Medicare, Medicaid & Medicare, No Insurance
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of each independent variable according
to insurance type. These variables make up the individual characteristics used to
estimate health insurance choices.
Table 3. Summary Statistics
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
Income 77.49 25.39 37.53 39.3 57.8 24.98 39.86 59.13
(51.03) (25.35) (34.01) (32.53) (47.39) (31.26) (37.67) (49.21)
Age 41.57 34.99 74.84 33.39 73.63 74.54 37.55 44.75
(12.56) (12.67) (6.42) (11.74) (6.64) (6.42) (12.71) (17.2)
Education13.61 11.18 11.57 12.28 12.93 8.85 11.15 12.56
(2.6) (2.7) (3.35) (2.35) (2.96) (4.29) (3.29) (3.15)
Gender 0.52 0.72 0.6 0.73 0.53 0.67 0.48 0.54
Married 0.65 0.35 0.52 0.44 0.64 0.33 0.48 0.57
Hispanic 0.19 0.37 0.13 0.25 0.07 0.29 0.48 0.26
Asian 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.14 0.04 0.07
Black 0.17 0.33 0.19 0.31 0.12 0.32 0.19 0.19
White 0.74 0.62 0.75 0.66 0.83 0.54 0.75 0.73
*Standard deviations in parenthesis.
**Standard deviations are not included for discrete indicators because they are
function of the mean.
Income refers to a consumer’s total family income scaled by 1,000. Family
income is used instead of individual income because insurance is often purchased by
family unit. Consumers with a family income greater than $300,000 are dropped.
Income is highest for those with Private Insurance followed by those with Private &
Medicare. Those on Medicaid have the lowest incomes.
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The sample is limited to consumers age 19 and over and top coded so that the
highest age is 85 years old. The highest average ages appear in those categories that
include Medicare where the mean age is about 74. Only those age 65 and over are
eligible for Medicare. Those choosing Medicaid, Private & Medicaid and No
Insurance have the lowest average ages.
Education represents the number of years of education an individual reported
completing. Those with Private Insurance have the most years of education with an
average of 13.6. Those options with no private insurance component include
individuals that average less than 12 years of school.
The sample includes more women than men. Only No Insurance contains a
higher proportion of men than women. Women make up more than 70 percent of
the consumers who choose Medicaid and Private & Medicaid. This is likely due to
increased access to pregnant women.
Those who are married are more likely to choose Private Insurance and Private
& Medicare. Those who are unmarried are more likely to choose Medicaid, Private
& Medicaid and Medicaid & Medicare. For those choosing Medicare or No
Insurance, about as many are married as are not.
The other independent variables control for race (Asian, Black, White or Other)
and ethnicity (Hispanic). For the purposes of this study, consumers race and
ethnicity are considered separately. Thus, in addition to being Hispanic (or not) a
person is also included in the Asian, Black or White category. The sample is
comprised of people of whom 73 percent are white, 19 percent are black and 7
percent are Asian. About a quarter of the sample is Hispanic.
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Cost
Each type of health insurance comes with a di↵erent price. In order to
incorporate this choice specific component, I estimate the cost using the following
model:
Ci = Incomei +Agei +Genderi +Marriedi +Hispanici +Asiani +Blacki +Whitei +"i
Cost is estimated using two di↵erent dependent variables including total charges
(the total amount charged to the consumer) and a ratio of out-of-pocket (the cost
paid by the consumer) to income. Figures 1 shows total charges for individuals with
each of the four choice sets. Figure 2 shows the total out-of-pocket costs for
individuals with each of the four choice sets.
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Figure 1. Total Charges
Figure 1 summarizes the predicted costs for individuals by their choice set. Each
individual is included in all options shown on a specific graph. The top left graph
shows individuals who choose between Private Insurance and No Insurance. Their
total charges tend to be less on average when they choose No Insurance. The top
right graphs shows individuals who also have the choice of Medicare. For this
population, those with No Insurance have the lowest total charges, followed by those
with Private Insurance. Those with Medicare and Private & Medicare have similar
levels of total charges, although the density of those with Medicare only shows
slightly higher total charges. The bottom left graph shows total charges for those
who choose from Private Insurance, Medicaid, Medicaid & Private Insurance and
No Insurance. Again total charges are relatively low for those who choose No
20
Insurance and Private Insurance. The density is much flatter if these individuals
choose Medicaid or Private & Medicaid meaning that total charges are greater on
average when these options are chosen. Finally, for those with all options, those
with No Insurance and Private Insurance have relatively low total charges. Those
who choose public options, especially Medicaid & Medicare, have greater total costs.
Figure 2. Predicted Out-of-Pocket Cost
Figure 2 shows out-of-pocket costs for individuals with each of the four choice
sets. Those with out-of-pocket costs greater than $2,000 are dropped from the
sample for the purposes of graphing. For those with just Private Insurance and No
Insurance, the predicted out-of-pocket cost is almost identical. This is shown in the
top left graph. The top right graph shows the predicted out-of-pocket for those who
can also choose Medicare. Out-of-pocket costs are lowest with private insurance for
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this group. Those with No Insurance and Private & Medicare pay a similar average
amount. Those with only Medicare pay the most out-of-pocket. The bottom left
graph shows those with Private Insurance, Medicaid, Private & Medicaid and No
Insurance as options. Out-of-pocket costs are nearly zero for those with Medicaid.
Those with Private Insurance and Private & Medicaid pay more on average than
those who are just on Medicaid, but less than those with No Insurance. Finally, of
those with all options, those with Medicaid pay the least. The density for the rest of
the programs is spread out rather evenly over the range of $0 to $2,000.
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CHAPTER VI
RESULTS
I present two models in what follows, each of which estimates the probability
that an individual chooses a certain type of health insurance. The regressors include
the individual specific characteristics described in Section 5, as well as an
alternative specific variable measuring some aspect of the cost of health insurance.
The cost variables used are total charges and a ratio of out-of-pocket cost to family
income. Finally, I present the predicted probabilities that an individual will choose
each of their available options in 2008. I compare these results with the predicted
choices of consumers in 2014, which assume that Medicaid will be expanded to cover
individuals up to 133 FPL due to the implementation of the ACA.
Total Charges
Table 4 gives the results for the model estimated with individual characteristics
and estimated total charges for each type of insurance. The estimates suggest that
health insurance choices are more dependent on individual characteristics than their
total charges for health care.
Income is significant for all options, yet the average marginal e↵ect is very small.
A $1,000 increase in income makes an individual more likely to choose all options
except for Medicare and no health insurance. However, at a maximum, it increases
the probability that an individual will choose another option by 0.6 percent. A
$1,000 decrease in income makes those eligible 0.3 percent more likely to choose
Medicare. This is likely due to the retirement and subsequent drop in income of
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many Medicare eligible individuals. Similarly, a $1,000 decrease in income increases
the probability that the individual will choose to forgo health insurance by 0.3
percent. Income has a small, significant overall e↵ect on the individuals choice.
Age has a significant e↵ect on consumers choosing any option. As age increases,
individuals are more likely to switch from having Private & Medicaid, Medicaid &
Medicare and No Insurance to another option. The probability of choosing Private
Insurance increases by about 0.2 percent with each additional year and the
probability of choosing Medicare increases by 0.4 percent. While the average
marginal e↵ect of age on choosing Medicaid is nearly zero, the probability of
choosing this option relative to choosing Private Insurance decreases with age. An
increase in age leaves consumers less likely to choose Medicaid & Medicare and No
Insurance.
Gender is only significant in the probability of options pertaining to Medicaid
and No Health Insurance. Women are about 7.0 percent more likely to choose
Medicaid and 0.8 percent more likely to choose Private & Medicaid. Part of this is
likely due to the eligibility of pregnant women under much higher FPL standards.
Males are 2.5 percent more likely to choose No Insurance. Gender is not a factor for
consumers choosing options with Medicare.
Married individuals are 9.7 percent less likely to choose Medicaid, 21.9 percent
less likely to choose Medicaid & Medicare and 3.8 percent less likely to choose No
Insurance. It increases the chances that you will choose Private & Medicaid by 1.6
percent and Private Insurance by 5.3 percent.
An increase in the number of years of education increases the probability that an
individual chooses Private Insurance. In particular, a one year increase in education
increases the chances of choosing Private by 2.3 percent. A one year decrease in the
years of education, increases the probability that an individual chooses Medicaid by
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1.3 percent, Medicaid & Medicare by 1.8 percent and No Insurance by 2.2 percent.
Table 4. Logit: Individual Characteristics and Total Charges
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Income 0.033⇤⇤⇤ 0.016⇤⇤⇤ 0.046⇤⇤⇤ 0.006⇤ 0.022⇤⇤⇤ 0.018⇤⇤⇤
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001)
[0.002] [0.006] [ 0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.006] [ 0.003]
Age  0.010⇤⇤⇤ 0.212⇤⇤⇤ 0.025⇤⇤⇤ 0.200⇤⇤⇤ 0.176⇤⇤⇤ 0.016⇤⇤⇤
(0.004) (0.039) (0.006) (0.040) (0.041) (0.002)
[0.002] [0.000] [0.004] [ 0.001] [0.000] [ 0.004] [ 0.002]
Gender 0.426⇤⇤⇤ 0.149 0.436⇤⇤⇤ 0.035 0.066  0.140⇤⇤⇤
(0.090) (0.319) (0.168) (0.319) (0.355) (0.041)
[0.010] [0.070] [0.023] [0.008] [ 0.020] [ 0.009] [ 0.025]
Married  0.785⇤⇤⇤ 0.202  0.327⇤⇤ 0.408  0.945⇤⇤  0.397⇤⇤⇤
(0.093) (0.335) (0.160) (0.336) (0.370) (0.044)
[0.053] [ 0.097] [ 0.003] [0.016] [0.061] [ 0.219] [ 0.038]
Education  0.155⇤⇤⇤ 0.018  0.006 0.062  0.095⇤⇤  0.192⇤⇤⇤
(0.016) (0.045) (0.033) (0.046) (0.049) (0.008)
[0.023] [ 0.013] [ 0.012] [0.007] [0.017] [ 0.018] [ 0.022]
Hispanic 0.279⇤⇤⇤ 0.232  0.427⇤⇤  0.780⇤ 0.703 0.887⇤⇤⇤
(0.106) (0.446) (0.190) (0.450) (0.489) (0.049)
[ 0.099] [ 0.003] [0.068] [ 0.041] [ 0.126] [0.204] [0.109]
Black 0.355  0.021 0.388  0.051 1.005  0.025
(0.259) (1.056) (0.434) (1.067) (1.313) (0.142)
[ 0.002] [0.050] [ 0.023] [0.007] [ 0.022] [0.190] [ 0.009]
White 0.051 0.261 0.422 0.637 0.527  0.333⇤⇤
(0.252) (1.031) (0.427) (1.040) (1.291) (0.138)
[0.035] [0.018] [ 0.072] [0.023] [0.073] [0.027] [ 0.044]
Asian 0.163 0.492  0.466 0.549 2.013  0.244
(0.321) (1.257) (0.561) (1.265) (1.486) (0.158)
[0.025] [0.065] [ 0.049] [ 0.031] [ 0.009] [0.282] [ 0.033]
Constant 2.819⇤⇤⇤ 10.605⇤⇤⇤ 1.046  11.444⇤⇤⇤ 7.025⇤⇤ 3.407⇤⇤⇤
(0.356) (2.991) (0.645) (2.995) (3.197) (0.188)
Total Charges 0.000
(0.000)
Log likelihood  12196.372
Note: Total Observations: 56,725; Unique id numbers: 20,958
Standard errors in parentheses. Average marginal e↵ects in square brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Race and ethnicity significantly a↵ect the probability of choosing various types
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of health insurance. Hispanics are 9.9 percent less likely to choose Private Insurance
than non-Hispanics. Hipsanics are also less likely to choose Medicaid, decreasing the
probability by an average of 0.3 percent, and Private & Medicaid, decreasing the
probability by 4.1 percent. Hispanics are 20.4 percent more likely to choose
Medicaid & Medicare and 10.9 percent more likely to choose No Insurance. Being
White decreases the probability of choosing no insurance by 4.4 percent. No other
findings about race and ethnicity are statistically significant.
Finally, the alternative specific variable total charges does not a↵ect consumers
health insurance choices. Table 5 presents the average marginal a↵ect of total
charges on consumers’ health insurance choices. The coe cients are scaled by
$100,000. While most results are zero or near zero even at this scaled level, some
changes in choices can be detected. In particular, all own e↵ects are negative.
Table 5. Average Marginal E↵ect: Total Charges
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1  0.048 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.043
2 0.024  0.070 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.030
3 0.001 0.000  0.082 0.000 0.069 0.011 0.001
4 0.003 0.015 0.000  0.021 0.000 0.000 0.003
5 0.002 0.000 0.069 0.000  0.077 0.006 0.000
6 0.001 0.002 0.044 0.000 0.025  0.072 0.001
7 0.043 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000  0.049
As total charges go up, the likelihood that consumers will choose another option
increases. The probability that consumers who chose Private Insurance will keep
Private Insurance decreases by 4.8 percent, while the probability that consumers
will choose any other option increases. The probability that consumers who chose
Medicaid will choose a di↵erent option is 7.0 percent, while the probability that
they will choose non-Medicare options increases. An increase of $100,000 increases
the probability that a consumer leaves Medicare by 8.2 percent. The probability
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that these consumers choose Private & Medicare or Medicaid & Medicare increases
at the same level. Of those who chose Private & Medicaid, the probability that they
will keep this option decreases by 2.1 percent. The probability that they will choose
Private, Medicaid or No Insurance increases. The probability of those who chose
Private & Medicare will keep this option decreases by 7.7 percent. The probability
that they will choose Medicare or Medicaid & Medicare increases by 6.9 percent and
2.5 percent respectively. Finally, the probability that those with No Insurance will
continue to choose this option decreases by 4.9 percent. The probability that they
will choose most other options increases, with the largest increase being a 4.3
percent increase in Private Insurance.
Figure 3 shows the probability of given choice given changes in total charges.
These graphs assume a median or mean value for all other variables by choice set.
The relatively flat lines on the graphs show the small e↵ect that total charges has
on the consumers’ insurance decisions.
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Figure 3. Predicted Total Cost
Out-of-Pocket Costs to Income
In Table 6, a second model is presented. This conditional logit model is
estimated using individual characteristics and an alternative specific ratio of
out-of-pocket cost to family income. The ratio of out-of-pocket costs to income is
highly significant. Thus, in this model, both the individual characteristics and the
alternative specific characteristics a↵ect consumers’ insurance choices.
Income is significant across all options. An increase of $1,000 in income decreases
the likelihood of choosing Medicare and No Insurance by 0.3 percent. It increases
the likelihood of choosing other options. An increase in income makes it more likely
that an individual will choose one of the other options, but by small amount.
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Age is also highly significant for all options. The younger the consumer’s age,
the more likely it is that he or she will choose Private & Medicaid, Medicaid &
Medicare or No Health Insurance. An increase in age makes an individual 0.4
percent more likely to choose Medicare and 0.2 percent more likely to choose
Private Insurance. The average marginal e↵ect of age on choosing Private &
Medicare is zero, but relative to Private Insurance are positive. This means that as
age increases, consumers are more likely to choose Private& Medicare, relative to
Private Insurance.
Gender e↵ects the probability that individual will choose Medicaid, Medicaid &
Private and No Insurance. Females are 6.9 percent more likely to choose Medicaid
and 0.7 percent more likely to choose Private & Medicaid. Males are 2.3 percent
more likely to choose No Insurance. For all other choices, gender does not
significantly a↵ect the probability that an individual will choose that particular
option.
Marriage significantly a↵ects the probability of most consumer health insurance
choices. Those that are married are 9.4 percent less likely to choose Medicaid, 22.8
percent less likely to choose Medicaid & Medicare and 3.9 percent less likely to
choose No Insurance. Marriage increases the probability that the consumer will
choose Private Insurance by 5.3 percent and Private & Medicaid by 1.6 percent.
Education significantly a↵ects the probability of choosing Medicaid, Medicaid &
Medicare and No Insurance. A one year decrease in education increases the
probability that the individual will choose Medicaid by 1.6 percent, Medicaid &
Medicare by 1.8 percent and No Insurance by 2.2 percent. Education was not
significant for other choices.
Race and ethnicity a↵ects the probability that consumers will make certain
health insurance choices. Hispanics are 4.1 percent less likely to choose Private &
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Medicaid and 11.9 percent less likely to Private & Medicare. Hispanics are 10.8
percent more likely to choose No Insurance. Whites are 4.6 percent less likely to
choose No Insurance. No other race variables are significant.
Table 6. Logit : Individual Characteristics and Out-of-Pocket/Income
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Income 0.034⇤⇤⇤ 0.017⇤⇤⇤ 0.047⇤⇤⇤ 0.006⇤⇤ 0.023⇤⇤⇤ 0.018⇤⇤⇤
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001)
[0.001] [0.006] [ 0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.006] [ 0.003]
Age  0.011⇤⇤⇤ 0.207⇤⇤⇤ 0.026⇤⇤⇤ 0.196⇤⇤⇤ 0.166⇤⇤⇤ 0.016⇤⇤⇤
(0.003) (0.039) (0.006) (0.039) (0.040) (0.002)
[0.002] [0.000] [0.004] [ 0.001] [0.000] [ 0.005] [ 0.002]
Gender 0.421⇤⇤⇤ 0.200 0.423⇤⇤ 0.073 0.087  0.127⇤⇤⇤
(0.090) (0.320) (0.167) (0.319) (0.353) (0.041)
[0.008] [0.069] [0.027] [0.007] [ 0.022] [ 0.013] [ 0.023]
Married  0.768⇤⇤⇤ 0.237  0.312⇤ 0.398  0.987⇤⇤⇤ 0.398⇤⇤⇤
(0.093) (0.338) (0.160) (0.337) (0.368) (0.044)
[0.053] [ 0.094] [0.007] [0.016] [0.054] [ 0.228] [ 0.039]
Education  0.155⇤⇤⇤ 0.029  0.007 0.052  0.106⇤⇤  0.192⇤⇤⇤
(0.016) (0.046) (0.033) (0.046) (0.048) (0.008)
[0.023] [ 0.012] [ 0.012] [0.007] [0.017] [ 0.018] [ 0.022]
Hispanic 0.291⇤⇤⇤ 0.276  0.425⇤⇤  0.789⇤ 0.563 0.879⇤⇤⇤
(0.106) (0.446) (0.190) (0.450) (0.488) (0.049)
[ 0.099] [0.000] [0.065] [ 0.041] [ 0.119] [0.182] [0.108]
Black 0.364 0.030 0.396 0.108 1.047  0.050
(0.259) (1.063) (0.436) (1.069) (1.307) (0.143)
[0.001] [0.053] [ 0.041] [0.007] [0.000] [0.180] [ 0.012]
White 0.053 0.311 0.395 0.752 0.644  0.355⇤⇤
(0.252) (1.037) (0.429) (1.042) (1.286) (0.139)
[0.037] [0.021] [ 0.085] [0.022] [0.085] [0.036] [ 0.046]
Asian 0.194 0.618  0.490 0.774 2.161  0.258
(0.320) (1.266) (0.564) (1.269) (1.481) (0.158)
[0.026] [0.072] [ 0.065] [ 0.033] [0.011] [0.279] [ 0.035]
Constant 2.790⇤⇤⇤ 10.116⇤⇤⇤ 1.049  11.132⇤⇤⇤ 6.212⇤⇤ 3.409⇤⇤⇤
(0.356) (2.976) (0.648) (2.980) (3.167) (0.188)
Out-of-Pocket 0.420⇤⇤
/Income (0.184)
Log likelihood  12194.8
Note: Total Observations: 56,725; Unique id numbers: 20,958
Standard errors in parentheses. Average marginal e↵ects in square brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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When health insurance choices are estimated using individual characteristics and
an estimated alternative-specific ratio of out-of-pocket cost to income, the results
suggest that the ratio and income have very significant, but very small e↵ects on the
individual’s choice. As in the previous model, all own e↵ects are negative. This
means that if income increases while out-of-pocket expenses decreases, the consumer
is likely to choose a di↵erent option. Conversely, if income decreases while
out-of-pocket costs increase, the consumer is also likely to change. The average
marginal e↵ect varies widely between options. These e↵ects are reported in Table 7.
These results should be interpreted as the e↵ect on the probability of a choice if
out-of-pocket costs increase by one.
Table 7. Average Marginal Costs: Out-of-Pocket Costs to Income
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1  0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005
2 0.003  0.008 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.003
3 0.000 0.000  0.009 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.000
4 0.000 0.002 0.000  0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000  0.008 0.001 0.000
6 0.00 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.003  0.008 0.000
7 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.005
The probability of switching from Private Insurance to another option is 0.5
percent for those who chose Private Insurance initially. If this ratio increases, the
probability that these consumers would choose Medicaid and No Insurance increases.
For those who initially chose Medicaid, the probability of choosing a di↵erent option
is 0.8 percent. Those consumers would likely choose Private & Medicaid or No
Insurance. For those choosing Medicare initially, the likelihood of switching to
another option is 0.9 percent. Medicare consumers would likely switch to Private &
Medicare or Medicaid & Medicare. Of those initially choosing Private & Medicaid,
the probability that they choose a di↵erent option with an increase in the ratio is
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.02 percent. These consumers would likely choose Medicaid if they switched. The
probability that consumers who chose Private & Medicare would choose the same
option decreases by 0.8 percent. These consumers would likely switch to Medicare
or Medicaid & Medicare. The probability that consumers who chose Medicaid &
Medicare will switch to another option with an increase in the ratio is 0.8 percent.
The probability that these consumers will choose Medicare or Private & Medicare
increases. Finally, the probability that consumers choose No insurance decreases by
0.5 percent. The probability that these consumers choose Private Insurance
increases by 0.5 percent. Overall, the e↵ects of out-of-pocket costs to income are
highly significant, but small unless out of pocket costs increase significantly.
Figure 4 shows the probability of choosing each option for a range of the ratio
out-of-pocket costs to income by choice set. Independent variables other than the
ratio are fixed at their mean or median. The relatively flat lines convey that unless
there is a large increase in the out-of-pocket costs, this variable has a small e↵ect on
consumer insurance choices.
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Figure 4. Predicted Out-of-Pocket Cost
ACA Comparison
In 2014, the implementation of ACA will expand the Medicaid program so that
all individuals under 65 years old and with an income less than 133 percent of the
FPL will be eligible. In addition, individuals with an income greater than $9,350
and a married couple with an income greater than $18,700 will be taxed. The
minimum tax will be $695 and the maximum will be $2,085.
In the chart below I present five models representing only those who were not
eligible for Medicaid in 2008, but that will be eligible in 2014 due to the
implementation of ACA. The model “2008” gives the average probability of
individuals’ choice in 2008. The model “No Tax” gives the average probability if
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Medicaid were expanded, but no tax were implemented. The model “1% Flat Tax”
gives the average probability if the minimum income requirements are implemented
along with a 1 percent tax on anyone who does not have insurance. The model “2.5
% - ACA Rules” gives the average probability if the ACA rules are implemented as
described above. Finally, the model “5 % Flat Tax” gives the average probability if
the minimum income requirements are implemented along with a 5 percent tax on
anyone who does not have insurance. The models are presented using the estimates
created from the logit model estimated with total charges and with the ratio of
out-of-pocket costs to income. The results are shown in Table 8 and Table 9.
Table 8. ACA Total Charges Model
2008 No Tax 1% Flat Tax2.5%-ACA Rules 5% Flat Tax
Private 0.4577 0.1660 0.1662 0.1668 0.1672
Medicaid . 0.5692 0.5685 0.5668 0.5657
Private & Medicaid . 0.0637 0.0635 0.0632 0.0630
No Insurance 0.5423 0.2012 0.2018 0.2033 0.2042
Table 9. ACA: Out-of-Pocket Cost to Income Model
2008 No Tax 1% Flat Tax2.5%-ACA Rules 5% Flat Tax
Private 0.4573 0.1667 0.1662 0.1673 0.1678
Medicaid . 0.5678 0.5685 0.5654 0.5642
Private & Medicaid . 0.0631 0.0635 0.0626 0.0624
No Insurance 0.5427 0.2024 0.2018 0.2046 0.2056
The results from each logit model are almost identical. In addition, the results
for each model after ACA is implemented are also almost identical. In 2008, the
probability of choosing Private Insurance is about 0.46, while the probability of
choosing No Health Insurance is about 0.54. After the expansion, the probability
that individuals in this group will choose Medicaid is 0.57 and the probability that
they will choose Private & Medicaid is 0.063 regardless of the model used. This
leads to a decrease in the probability that these individuals will choose Private
34
Insurance of 0.29 and No Health Insurance of 0.34.
The implications of implementing ACA are threefold. First, the increase in the
availability of Medicaid will likely crowd out Private Insurance to some extent.
However, even when individuals have the option of choosing Medicaid, a free health
insurance option, about 36 percent of those who had private insurance will likely
keep their private insurance. The estimates suggest that a little more than half of
the newly eligible switch to Medicaid and about 6.3 percent switch to Private &
Medicaid.
The second implications is that while ACA will cause major changes to occur in
the health insurance industry, it will not completely change in the system in terms
of enrollees. This expansion a↵ects a relatively small portion of the population. For
this study, 1,947 of 20,958 individuals (9.3 percent) become eligible for Medicaid
under the expansion who were not eligible before. The crowd-out rate of Private
Insurance will likely not change for other segments of the population.
In this model, the taxing scheme did not significantly e↵ect the consumers
choices. However, this model does not incorporate the e↵ect of the price of Private
Insurance premiums on the choice of consumers choosing no insurance and being
taxed. Once the tax exceeds the cost of buying insurance, it seems likely that
individuals will choose to buy it. this is an area that need further study.
Limitations
This study faced significant limitations. First, I was unable to identify the exact
population that was eligible for Medicaid in 2008 due to data access restrictions.
Identifying this information would make this study more precise. Second, this study
does not incorporate the cost of health insurance premiums. This may significantly
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a↵ect insurance choices, especially after ACA is implemented. Finally, this study
does not incorporate all of the changes in benefits that have occurred since 2008 or
that will occur by 2014. In particular, a decrease in benefits is planned for the
Medicare population. This may increase the choice of Private & Medicare. Other
changes have occurred as well and will likely influence choices in the future.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
In an e↵ort to extend health insurance coverage to all Americans, President
Barack Obama signed into law the ACA in March 2010. ACA requires most U.S.
citizens and legal residents to have health insurance by 2014 or face tax penalties
(KFF 2011). With the deadline for Americans to acquire health insurance
approaching, it is important to identify who is currently uninsured, so that steps
can be taken to make the insurance system more accessible to them. By identifying
additional characteristics of these populations will aid policymakers in their quest to
design health insurance options that realistically meet the needs of the currently
uninsured.
This study found that out-of-pocket costs relative to family income of each
insurance option have a significant e↵ect on the consumer’s insurance choice. In
addition, individual characteristics play a key role. Hispanics, men and unmarried
individuals are less likely to have health insurance than other populations. Whites
and women are more likely to be insured. Policymakers can use these types of
trends to target enrollment and help get everyone insured by 2014.
Of those a↵ected by the expansion of Medicaid, this study predicts more than 60
percent will change from Private Insurance and No Insurance to Medicaid or Private
& Medicaid. A significance amount of crowd-out of the private sector occurs, but
overall this population represents less than 10 percent of total population. Overall,
the implementation will go a long way towards insuring many more Americans.
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